A bunch of blog posts on this site make the incontrovertible point that, when it mattered, the US opposed targets and timetables for emissions reductions. This was in the period 1989 to 1992, under George H.W. Bush, when the world ended up with a framework convention on climate change. The blog posts where I mention this usually contrast what the US was opposing with what the Europeans (led by the French) were pushing for.
That’s fine, as far as it goes, but it is a little bit black and white, a little lacking in nuance.
This quote below from an excellent article by two Americans in a position to know the detail, is something I will link to in future.
“Based on the uncertainty of predictions of key economic indices, such as world fuel prices, and uncertainty over the consequences of some proposed actions, such as a carbon tax, the U.S. was flatly opposed to any targets and time tables. There was also concern that Congress would mandate targets without sufficient information not the economic consequences. Why some E.C. countries supported targets and timetables knowing that these targets could not be met without some costs is complicated and subject to many different interpretations. At the time, most of the analyses in Europe were based on simple linear programming models that produced results showing substantial savings over the lifecycle of more energy efficient technologies. Few macroeconomic models had been run in Europe. Our assertion is that setting targets and timetables became for many European governments symbolic of showing political leadership by challenging the U.S. Remember that the negotiations began after a period of eight years during which the U.S. was largely perceived as a reluctant partner in international issues and had denied that climate change was an important problem 41. It also came at a time of great euphoria in Europe. Communist governments in many countries were losing power. The E.C. was moving quickly towards monetary and social union. This excitement carried over to environmental policy as many European ministers vied to make Europe the center of influence on environmental issues. These ministers also saw targets and timetables as a means of motivating their own governments (especially trade ad finance ministries) to move policies in a more green direction.”
(Hecht and Tirpak 1995: 388)
Footnote 41 is thus
41. State Department participant in the negotiations, Dan Reifsnyder, offered the view that the concept of targets and timetables “captured and riveted the public’s imagination. It provided a simple litmus test of a country’s environment commitment. It required no painstaking feasibility analysis or tedious review of specific mitigation measures. It was political genius.” Speech to 1992 Seoul Symposium on ‘UNCED and Prospects for the Environmental Regime in the 21st Century’, September 2, 1992, Seoul, Korea.
Hecht, A. and Tirpak, D. 1995. Framework Agreement on Climate Change: A Scientific and Policy History. Climatic Change, 29, 371-402.
P.S. That said, if they had been, you know responsible, the Bush team could have said “we think it’s too early, but let’s defo talk about it at the first meeting of the Parties/in ‘x’ years.”