Forty five years ago, on this day, February 21 1978, a workshop took place at the Cold War lek known as IIASA, in Austria.
Carbon dioxide, climate and society – Proceedings of a IIASA workshop co-sponsored by WMO, UNEP and SCOPE, (Laxenburg, Austria) 21-24 Feb 1978.
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 335.2ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
In the US the 1977 NAS report had come out. UNEP were hosting meetings with the WMO Preparations were underway for the First World Climate Conference, to be held in February 1979. IIASA had been looking at Energy and Climate for a while, including with previous workshops in 1975 and this one in 1976 about Climate and Solar Energy. Some of the big names – Flohn, Nordhaus etc, were around.
What I think we can learn from this
Smart people were “on it” quite early (i.e. 20 years after Plass, Revelle, Bolin, Keeling et al had seen what the problem was). They scratched their heads and couldn’t see easy ways forward Because there weren’t any. There certainly aren’t any now.
What happened next
This meeting and others fed into the late 1970s awareness of the problem (among a tiny number of people!)
IIASA kept having consequential meetings on climate (see their stuff on CCS in the early 2000s)
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
References
Schrickel, I. (2017) Control versus complexity: approaches to the carbon dioxide problem at IIASAWynne, B. (1984) The Institutional Context of Science, Models, and Policy: The IIASA Energy Study. Policy Sciences
Fifty seven years ago, on this day, February 20, 1966, another US senate hearing got an allusion to trouble ahead, from a particle physicist called Leland Haworth.
“Another thing that is in a strict sense a pollutant but not usually thought of as such is the carbon dioxide that comes from all our burning of fossil fuels — coal, oil, gas, and so forth — which is adding to the carbon dioxide content of the air. It is not a pollutant in the sense of doing any harm to us directly, but it could change the temperature balance of the world.”
— Leland Haworth, hearing on weather modification
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 321.6ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
The President’s address to Congress in February 1965 had mentioned build-up of C02, and a report that came out in November did likewise. The National Science Foundation was doing further work on this, which Haworth would have been well aware of. There had been a report, released in late 1965 on the topic, which had looked at David Keeling’s measurements (as per Gordon MacDonald to Oppenheimer and Boyle, 1990).
What I think we can learn from this
A problem can be on the sidelines for a long time, and may even disappear into nothing. For a problem to become an issue will be, usually, the end result of a lot of hard work, and a few capitalised-upon disasters…. It took a while for “climate change” to break through (30 years, when it probably only needed 20 – there is a plausible alternative history narrative where by the late 1970s, the issue gets dealt with (though probably would have required the late-Brezhnev era Soviet Union to innovate, so, maybe not so plausible?!).
What happened next
By the late 1960s, more work was being done, more talk about it, including in the context of the Americans wanting a non-napalming-babies issue to talk about internationally (see Moynihan September 1969 memo). The American Association for the Advancement of Science was getting in on the act too, and by 1970, most people talking about air pollution would at least mention in passing the (potential) climate problem.
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
Twenty years ago, on this day, February 19 2003, carbon capture and storage got another nudge forward, at least in terms of rhetoric…
19 to 21 Feb 2003 As discussed earlier, the 2002 Geneva meeting produced a plan for an exploratory workshop on the issue, which took place in November 2002 in Regina, Canada. The actual process of report preparation began after the formal decision to compile the report, made at the IPCC meeting in February 2003 in Paris.
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 375.8ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
In the aftermath of the President George “The Supreme Court got me the gig” Bush having pulled the USA out of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, attention turned to various techno-fixes, including Carbon Capture and Storage, which had been in the background/on the drawing board for a decade plus.
Longer term context – some had clearly been eyeing the deep oceans as places to dump waste, and this had gotten the ‘right’ scientists curious…
“Second, ocean mixing. Here too Revelle had a long-established curiosity, and here too nuclear energy pushed the topic forward. The wastes from nuclear reactors must be disposed of somewhere, and the ocean floor seemed a likely choice. In 1955 when Revelle spoke of studying ocean circulation he emphasized the need to bury the “unbelievable quantities of radioactive substances” expected to pour from civilian reactors…”
Weart 1997 342
What I think we can learn from this
Dreams of technological salvation are very popular, but always need someone to write them. And the money to pay those people to write those fantasies has to come from somewhere…
What happened next
The IPCC’s special report on CCS came out in early 2005, and was a very big deal – an example of the halo effect of the credibility of impact science being lent to production science. But the CCS plants have still not yet been built, and the ones that did were all about Enhanced Oil “Recovery”.
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
Twelve years ago, on this day, February 18, 2011 Australia’s chief scientific advisor Penny Sackett downed tools. She said in her statement – “”Institutions, as well as individuals, grow and evolve, and for both personal and professional reasons the time is now right for me to seek other ways to contribute.” (source)
This move was regarded at the time – rightly or wrongly – as a rebuke/frustration with the lack of ambition on climate policy.
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 392ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
Prime Minister Julia Gillard was in the middle of a shitstorm over climate policy that continued for months (Feb to August 2011).
What I think we can learn from this
Offering scientific advice to politicians is at best a very tough gig. At worst, you’re a fig leaf/complicit.
What happened next
Following chief scientific advisors were more willing to sing the praises of fantasy technologies and keep their heads down. Whether or not current and future generations are well-served by that is, well….
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
Ten years ago, on this day, February 17, 2013 , a protest march and arrests took place in Washington DC
Following Nebraska’s approval of the route for Phase IV of the Keystone XL Pipeline in January, about 50,000 people gathered at the Washington Monument and marched to the White House. Demonstrators demanded President Obama block the Keystone XL Pipeline and take action against climate change. Four-dozen protestors, including Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Darryl Hannah, James Hansen, Sierra Club Founder Adam Werbach, and environmental activist Bill McKibben, were arrested at the gates of the White House for civil disobedience.
“In 2015 KXL was temporarily delayed by PresidentBarack Obama. On January 24, 2017, President Donald Trump took action intended to permit the pipeline’s completion. On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden signed an executive order to revoke the permitthat was granted to TC Energy Corporation for the Keystone XL Pipeline (Phase 4). On June 9, 2021, TC Energy abandoned plans for the Keystone XL Pipeline.”
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
References and see also
Bradshaw, E.A. Blockadia Rising: Rowdy Greens, Direct Action and the Keystone XL Pipeline. Critical Criminology 23, 433–448 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-015-9289-0
Thirty years ago, on this day, February 17, 1993 , new President Bill Clinton gave his state of the union address and said an energy tax was in the cards…
“Our plan does include a broad-based tax on energy, and I want to tell you why I selected this and why I think it’s a good idea. I recommend that we adopt a Btu tax on the heat content of energy as the best way to provide us with revenue to lower the deficit because it also combats pollution, promotes energy efficiency, promotes the independence, economically, of this country as well as helping to reduce the debt, and because it does not discriminate against any area. Unlike a carbon tax, that’s not too hard on the coal States; unlike a gas tax, that’s not too tough on people who drive a long way to work; unlike an ad valorem tax, it doesn’t increase just when the price of an energy source goes up. And it is environmentally responsible. It will help us in the future as well as in the present with the deficit.”
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 357.4ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
Vice President Al Gore had been switched onto the climate problem while studying at Harvard (Roger Revelle had taught him). He had had a book called “Earth in the Balance” come out while he was on the campaign trail. He thought you could raise money to reduce the government deficit while also cutting emissions….
What I think we can learn from this
War game the heck out of your proposal, with red team and blue team and all that…
What happened next
Resistance from the “energy lobby” (who knew?!) Brutally successful opposition too.
Twenty years ago, on this day, February 17, 2003, New South Wales Premier Bob Carr (long aware of climate problems) accuses John Howard of merely going along with the US in not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.
Bob Carr has today released a new report, sponsored by three Labor states, that he says shows that the cost to Australia of not joining the treaty will be higher than joining it. It claims that countries that do not ratify the agreement on greenhouse gas emissions will lose out on future investment opportunities in renewable energies.
Mr Carr has also proposed setting up a new office in New South Wales to oversee the use of renewable energy and carbon emissions.
He says if the Prime Minister will not act then he is forced to show leadership on the issue. “I think it’s not unfair to say of our Prime Minister, that all his instincts are very, very conservative and he’s going along with America,” he said. “He’s going along with America but if there was ever a case for running a policy independent of Washington this is it.”
ABC, 2003 Carr accuses Howard of poor leadership. 17 February 2003
Meanwhile, on the same day, Greenpeace tried to widen the existing split within the Business Council of Australia over the Kyoto Protocol….
SYDNEY, Feb 17, AAP – One of Australia’s big four banks has indicated its support for an international treaty to cut greenhouse gases.
Greenpeace today said initial findings of its survey of Business Council of Australia (BCA) members revealed Westpac supported the aims and objectives of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
AAP. 2003. Westpac supports Kyoto Protocol – Greenpeace. Australian Associated Press Financial News Wire, 17 Feb
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 376.6ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
John Howard was cuddling up to George Bush on everything – the attack on Iraq, trashing climate diplomacy, you name it. Carr was busy still trying to turn New South Wales into some sort of exemplar, at least for carbon trading (thus the report and the Gore-schmoozing).
Meanwhile, Greenpeace was having to do WWF’s job of splitting the business sector, because WWF was being very friendly with Howard (though to be fair, later in 2003, WWF tried to grow a pair. Sort of).
What I think we can learn from this
Finding/enlarging splits between government and business and splitting apart the (usually superficial) unity of business is something that NGOs can be good at. Greenpeace and the Australian Conservation Foundation kept at it, and it sort of bore fruit in 2006. Strange fruit, but fruit. Sort of (no, not really, but what are you going to do?)
What happened next
Howard never signed up for Kyoto, to his cost in 2007
Various “pro”-climate business groupings have come and gone since 2003. Lots of warm words, not much else, though they would all dispute that, naturally.
Carr stopped being Premier in 2005, and later served as Julia Gillard’s Foreign Affairs Minister
And we all lived hotly ever after, until we didn’t.
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
Sixteen years ago, on this day, February 16, 2007, as the second big wave of climate awareness was kicking off in Australia, a senior Liberal politician was… being himself.
It SHOULD not be seen as a sin to be cautious about the science of global warming, a senior Federal Government minister has warned.
Finance Minister Nick Minchin says “there remains an ongoing debate about the extent of climate change” and the extent of human activity’s role in global warming.
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 384ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
Nick Minchin had been successful in defeating an emissions trading scheme in the year 2000. And he had remained one of John Howard’s staunch culture warriors on the question of climate. From late 2006 people in Australia started to become reawakened to the climate problem and Minchin was pushing back in the way that old white men so often do. By this I mean pointing the finger at people and calling them hysterical and accusing them of panicking without bothering to think that maybe there is something to panic about.
What I think we can learn/remember from this
Just a reminder that just because someone is “successful” does not mean they cannot be a harmful dolt.
The sorts of things that Minchin accuses others of doing – cherry picking data, being unscientific – that’s all projection, that’s what he’s doing.
There are always old white men who will come out with this bullshit and of course now they’ve painted themselves into a corner and would have to admit that they had been wrong which would be psychologically devastating for them.
What happened next
Labor won the Federal election at the end of the year and fundamentally bollocksed up the politics and policy. Well done, Kevin. You’re from Queensland and you’re here to really screw things up.
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
Dr Dani Shanley writes a guest post about responsible innovation.
“Technology: Hero or Villain?” So reads the title of an article published in the LA Times in 1967. It states: where once “America had been a land of boundless optimism,” by the late 1960s, increasing pessimism seemed to reflect a “sour assessment of ‘progress’”. Concerns about emerging technologies were contributing to the “depressing feeling” that “technological ‘progress’ was creating new problems as fast, or faster, than it solved old ones”. At the same time, across much of Western Europe too, science and technology were the subject of increasing public ambivalence. For while modern technology may not have been producing the utopia it once promised, it was clear that its absence wouldn’t either.
It is almost impossible to avoid the hype surrounding AI, autonomous vehicles, cryptocurrency, or virtual reality.
Hero or villain; utopian or dystopian; good or bad… If you think for a minute about what we see in the media today, the landscape is full of similarly opposing claims, from public figures and tech journalists, CEOs and politicians; It is almost impossible to avoid the hype surrounding AI, autonomous vehicles, cryptocurrency, or virtual reality.
Depending on where you get your news, you might think that these technologies are going to make life easier for us all, making us happier and healthier in the process, or, that their benefits are sensationalized, that their risks are largely unknown, and that those involved in their development are unethical, immoral, and solely interested in turning a profit.
There is often a subtext to the hero or villain discussion, one which has been made increasingly explicit in recent years, which concerns what it means to develop technologies responsibly andhow technological change may trigger us to reevaluate what responsibility means.
Though thinking about what responsibility means in the context of scientific research and technological development is far from new, around the turn of the millennium, responsibility became an increasingly important concept in relation to research and innovation.
For example, we might think about how responsibility matters with regards to either the processes or societal impacts of technological change. Within the research system, codes of conduct and ethics committees have become commonplace. So too have a number of research funding criteria: for example, researchers are regularly required to include multiple perspectives in their research ; to think about the possible impacts of their research; and to attain some form of ethical clearance before starting their research. Research funding is also often organized around particular themes or focus areas, such as the UN’s sustainable development goals. Today, all of these efforts are broadly captured under the banner of responsibleinnovation.
Over the last decade or so, responsible innovation has become a popular way of thinking about whether or not we can define the right outcomes and impacts of research and innovation and subsequently, if we can agree upon these outcomes, whether we can be successful in directing innovation towards them.
it is clearly quite difficult to be against—as some have rightly asked, who could possibly be for irresponsible innovation
Internationally, this way of talking about responsibility-related concerns gained considerable traction particularly in the Netherlands, the UK,
Norway, and parts of the U.S. As a result, a variety of meetings, research groups, projects and networks have been involved in defining and institutionalizing the idea of responsible innovation.
In that responsible innovation broadly reflects valuable and worthy ambitions it is clearly quite difficult to be against—as some have rightly asked, who could possibly be for irresponsible innovation? Yet at the same time, the ambitions of responsible innovation do reflect a very particular set of concerns, over and above or perhaps even at the expense, of others.
It is important to recognize that as a way of envisioning responsibility and putting responsibility into practice, responsible innovation was not always already a matter of concern for academics and policymakers. Rather, responsible innovation came into being in a historically specific process that was shaped by previous approaches and methods which were also historically rooted in visions of how science and society (ought to) relate.
As such, it is important to consider how the web of evolving influence that shapes our understanding of responsible innovation today extends back into the distant past. Making sense of why responsible innovation reflects the concerns that it does therefore requires a critical examination of its history.
First of all, the way we talk about history often suggests that the wheels move only in one direction. For example, within the literature on responsible innovation, history is often used to support its objectives, providing a neat frame of reference for how things came to be in the present, essentially presenting the emergence of responsible innovation as the logical outcome of prior developments. From this point of view, responsible innovation is seen as an inevitable product of the past. Drawing upon less linear narratives helps to demonstrate the extent to which people have found visions of responsibility unconvincing—or at least only temporarily convincing at various times over the years.
Second, in policy making and innovation, the emphasis is often on looking towards the future. Though it is undoubtedly positive that we widely encourage anticipation of the future, it means that we often tend to overlook the lessons of history. In the case of responsible innovation, critical historical reflection not only adds nuance and depth when thinking about the imagined trajectories of technoscientific developments, but also provides important insights for thinking about the possible future(s) of the responsible innovation movement itself. In this sense, history may potentially offer us some guidance in the present. For while the present is never the same as the past, we can still learn important lessons from how things went before; or, as the old adage goes, history doesn’t repeat, but it does sometimes rhyme. Understanding the successes and failures of earlier movements could potentially inform and shape how we talk about and practice responsible innovation today.
Third, it is important that we consider who gets a say in constructing the historical narrative of an idea, a movement, or a field. We need to ask who it is who is doing the remembering. Historical reflection on responsible innovation, when it has taken place, has tended to come from insiders speaking from their own first-hand experiences. Such accounts are valuable and informative, yet, it is important to distinguish between practical pasts, which are largely based on individual experience and used as a means for people to make sense of their own lived experience in order to convey it to others; and historical pasts, which are the result of “critical enquiry”. Opening up the history of responsible innovation beyond existing insider accounts allows alternative accounts to come into view, potentially problematizing or at least providing context to the ways in which responsibility is being mobilized.
Finally, one of the problems with responsible innovation is that it focuses our attention on “innovation” – on the next big, shiny thing which promises to disrupt, transform or otherwise alter the way we live our lives, for better or worse. Responsible innovation itself was also presented as being new and transformative, with regards to the organization and functioning of the research system. Of course there has always been hype around what is new, but the problem is that this hype often clouds some of the real problems that we have, and perhaps should be spending our resources on solving. It may be far less exciting to think about infrastructures, or maintenance, for example, about the kinds of things that are essential to keeping things running – but if we are truly going to think about responsibility, and about what enables anything resembling the good life, then we also have to think about the systems, processes, and people that keep all the shiny, new things running once they become a part of our daily lives.
What histories of responsible innovation show us is that while some ideas about responsibility may have eroded and faded away, others have merely changed shape, poised to reemerge under the right conditions—say when proactive groups mobilize around alternative ideas about the future or when technological change catalyzes public concern. At a time when our world is confronted by numerous inescapable societal and environmental challenges, many of which are seen as the indirect consequences of scientific and technological developments, we must continue thinking about the different ways in which responsibility matters be that under the guise of responsible innovation, or, by any other name.
Dani Shanley is currently a post-doctoral researcher at Maastricht University working on the GuestXR project (www.guestxr.eu), which is about the construction of intelligent virtual environments. Her expertise is mainly within science and technology studies (STS) and the philosophy of technology, with a particular focus on reflexive, participatory design methodologies (or, responsible innovation), such as social labs and value sensitive design (VSD). She is primarily interested in questions concerning the ethics and politics of emerging technologies.
Dani recently defended her PhD, entitled ‘Making Responsibility Matter: The Emergence of Responsible Innovation as an Intellectual Movement’ – full text available here: http://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20221208ds
Ten years ago, on this day, February 15, 2013, a journo for the Melbourne Age writes a piece about the then-all-the-rage topic of “unburnable carbon”
Energy analysts and activists warn that most of the world’s fossil fuels must remain in the ground, and that it can’t be business as usual for the industry.
Green, M. 2013. Bursting the carbon bubble. The Age,15 February, p.16.
The amount of carbon dioxide in the air was roughly 397ppm. As of 2023 it is 419ppm, but check here for daily measures.
The context was
This “unburnable carbon”/”carbon bubble rhetoric was all the rage 10 years ago. It looked like the UNFCCC process was going to be a slow route back to feeling that the system could deliver. Copenhagen had been a failure, Paris was two and a half years off and it was still not clear that it would provide anything. So all those people who need to believe that there are levers and buttons in the policy sphere that we can push turn their attention to the idea that investors rather than statesmen could solve the problems; they just needed to be given stark advice that investing in stranded assets was a bad idea.
How do you strand an asset? Well, ultimately, you need to have markets and regulations that make some investments,a bad idea and other investments a better one. How would you do that on carbon? Well, you would need a strong legally binding international agreement (which you can’t get), and therefore, we’re all toast.
.
What I think we can learn from this
Using one “part” of the financial system – whether it is the re-insurers, the insurers, the institutional investors as the leverage point, the secret push-this-button-to-change-the-system is a long-standing and soothing idea for a certain kind of climate-motivated person. Some of them are super-smart. This does not mean they are right.
Unburnable carbon as a meme allowed people to hold conferences, put out press releases, videos, get interviewed on Newsnight and podcasts and generally feel that things were still salvageable. Am I too cynical? My therapist says so.(1)
What happened next
You hear less about unburnable carbon these days, now that Paris and Net Zero are flooding the zone.
What do you think? Does this pass the ‘so what?’ threshold? Have I got facts wrong? Interpretation wrong? Do comment on this post.
As someone who read this before publication said – “I understand the dynamics of hoping there is a secret lever to pull, but in dismissing that at the same time as providing a psychological sort of explanation for why people keep coming back to this, you might be throwing the baby out with the bath water. There may not be a simple lever we can pull, but even if a mass movement formed which highly organized, highly effective and coordinated, competent, resourceful and dedicated, in the way you would like to see, it would still end up having to deal with the power of capital and would be highly involved in trying to pull these various “levers”