With the benefit of hindsight, this closing sentences are amusing.
“The report said there was no cause for panic. But Mr Revelle said, “We have to be prepared to go to other sources than coal in about 50 years”.”
Why this matters.
The Canberra Times is one of the newspapers for the big decision makers in Australia. “We knew.” But the lurer of coal was too strong…
What happened next?
Four years later the Office of National Information (a spy/analyst outfit) wrote about the Greenhouse effect. Speedy, huh? Another four years or so and we got the Greenhouse Project, courtesy of Barry Jones’ “Commission for the Future.” But I am getting ahead of myself…
On this day, July 25 1997 the US Senate unanimously (95–0) passed Senate Resolution 98 (also referred to as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.
It said – contra what the USA had already agreed when it ratified the 1992 UNFCCC – that it would sign no deals that didn’t include the developing world making cuts as well. You know, those peoples who had done nothing to cause the problem, and were already on the pointy end.
This was the at the culmination of a very well-funded and well-executed campaign by US corporate interests to reframe international environmental agreements as an attack on US sovereignty, and on the employment prospects of US workers – see for example this and this..
Why this matters.
Shows you the power of corporate mobilisations, dunnit?
What happened next?
The US negotiated a deal at Kyoto, and signed it, but it was never going to get through the Senate, even if Gore hadn’t had the 2000 election pinched from him by the Supreme Court. Then George W. Bush pulled out of Kyoto altogether, in March 2001.
On this day, 25 July, 1977 the New York Times ran a front page story, by its science reporter, Walter Sullivan. Its title – “Scientists Fear Heavy Use of Coal May Bring Adverse Shift in Climate“
“Highly adverse consequences” may follow if the world, as now seems likely, depends increasingly on coal for energy over the next two centuries, according to a blue‐ribbon panel of scientists.
“In a report to the National Academy of Sciences on their two‐and‐a‐half‐year study, the scientists foresee serious climate changes beginning in the next century. By the latter part of the 22nd century a global warming of 10 degrees Fahrenheit is indicated, with triple that rise in high latitudes.”
Sullivan, W. (1977) Scientists Fear Heavy Use of Coal May Bring Adverse Shift in Climate New York Times, July 25, p.1
On this day, July 25, 1989, the Australian Minister for the Environment, Graham Richardson, gave a speech at the National Press Club. He admitted he had been blocked by Treasury in his bid to announce on a strong target for Australian emissions reductions.
“As the Minister for the Environment, Senator Richardson, yesterday [25 July 1989] talked tough to the States about using constitutional powers to override their decisions, he admitted he had been defeated by his Cabinet colleagues on a stronger federal environmental statement.
He confirmed that the Treasurer, Mr Keating, had been a prime mover in defeating his proposal that Australia aim to reduce greenhouse emissions by 20 per cent by 2005….
His frank comments at the National Press Club were clearly aimed at shielding himself against criticism from the conservation movement and the public that he did not fight hard enough for the environment.
But they might also add to tensions between himself and Mr Keating.
Referring to a report by Michelle Grattan, The Age newspaper’s chief political correspondent, that he had been rolled, Senator Richardson said that she had not been aware that a meeting between “Paul Keating and myself was to take place the morning after the Cabinet meeting to settle the wording of the statement of this issue”.
In Senator Richardson’s view this had resulted in considerable improvement –
“None the less, my old cobber was right in suggesting I was rolled on the setting of a target for a reduction of greenhouse gases,” he said.
“I had asked Cabinet to agree to the target agreed upon by the Toronto Conference, i.e. 20 per cent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005.
“… When I put this target to our Cabinet, I came under close questioning by the economic ministers. I couldn’t sustain my argument with sufficient science.”
“I haven’t yet learnt how to lose gracefully so I was angry. I delved into the department’s records so that I could write to my Cabinet colleagues and demand a reconsideration. The cupboard, however was bare, and the letter was never written.”
Dunn, R. 1989. Cabinet reduces greenhouse target. Australian Financial Review, 26 July.
Why this matters.
So. Many. Missed. Opportunities.
What happened next?
Australia got a carefully hedged announcement about emissions reductions, so the next Federal Environment Minister could go to the Second World Climate Conference – which was the starting gun for the international negotiations for a treaty – with something in her hand.
On this day, July 24, American climate scientist Thomas F. Malone used the imagery of traffic lights while discussing the two and a half year study by the National Academy of Science into climate change.
“During a press conference convened in late July 1977, for instance, Malone cast the climate problem as a “flashing yellow light,” a clear indication of the academy’s desire to seriously consider the risks of climate change without investing too much in crafting policies that could inflame public anxieties and, in turn, sanction a red-light approach to fossil fuel emissions.” (Henderson 2019: 401)
See also – “Study Warns of Overreliance on Fossil Fuels,” Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph, 25 Jul 1977.
See also Omang (1979).
Why this matters.
We knew.
What happened next?
You know.
And sorry, but tomorrow’s post is also about this NAS report.
On this day, 23 July 1979, the “Ad Hoc Study Group on C02 and Climate” begins at Woods Hole, giving us the “Charney Report.”
Short version – a scientist (Gordon MacDonald) and a Friends of the Earth activist (Rafe Pomerance) had managed to get President Jimmy Carter’s science advisor (Frank Press) to get Carter to request a study on whether this “greenhouse effect” thing was gonna actually be the problem some were saying.
So folks met, under the leadership of one of the big original beasts of atmospheric science, Jule Charney.
The scientists summoned by Jule Charney to judge the fate of civilization arrived on July 23, 1979, with their wives, children and weekend bags at a three-story mansion in Woods Hole, on the southwestern spur of Cape Cod. They would review all the available science and decide whether the White House should take seriously Gordon MacDonald’s prediction of a climate apocalypse. The Jasons had predicted a warming of two or three degrees Celsius by the middle of the 21st century, but like Roger Revelle before them, they emphasized their reasons for uncertainty. Charney’s scientists were asked to quantify that uncertainty. They had to get it right: Their conclusion would be delivered to the president. But first they would hold a clambake.
They gathered with their families on a bluff overlooking Quissett Harbor and took turns tossing mesh produce bags stuffed with lobster, clams and corn into a bubbling caldron. While the children scrambled across the rolling lawn, the scientists mingled with a claque of visiting dignitaries, whose status lay somewhere between chaperone and client — men from the Departments of State, Energy, Defense and Agriculture; the E.P.A.; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. They exchanged pleasantries and took in the sunset. It was a hot day, high 80s, but the harbor breeze was salty and cool. It didn’t look like the dawning of an apocalypse.
Why this matters.
“We” really knew enough by the late 70s. Everything since then has been footnotes.
What happened next?
Carter lost the 1980 election, handsomely. It would be another 8 years before the simulacrum of international action began.
We need to remember that organizations come and go, and are creatures of their time, and can be “trapped” – by their own cognitive and emotional settings, by others expectations and perceptions of them. A little like humans themselves, donchathink?
What happened next?
The Conservation Society was influential and important in the late 60s – we will come back to the 1968 lecture by Ritchie Calder. Its apogee was 1971-2, when it hosted a conference with Paul Ehrlich as a guest speaker. Its decline in influence through the 1970s and 80s (it was wound up in 1987) was tied to the rise of groups like Friends of the Earth and The Ecology Party (aka The Green Party), not tied to population concerns and not perceived as old, white and conservative.
On this day in 1968 Gordon Macdonald’s chapter on weather and climate modification, under the title “How to Wreck the Environment” (pdf here) appeared Nigel Calder’s book “Unless Peace Comes a Scientific Forecast of New Weapons” was published
A shortened version of the chapter had already appeared in New Scientist in April of the same year
“How to wreck the environment.” New Scientist. 25 April 1968):180- 82;
MacDonald noted
“There has been much controversy in recent years about conjectured overall effects on the world’s climate of emissions of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere from furnaces and engines burning fossil fuels, and some about possible influences of the exhaust from large rockets on the transparency of the upper atmosphere. Carbon dioxide placed in the atmosphere since the start of the industrial revolution has produced an increase in the average temperature of the lower atmosphere of a few tenths of a degree Fahrenheit. The water vapour that may be introduced into the stratosphere by the supersonic transport may also result in a similar temperature rise. In principle it would be feasible to introduce material into the upper atmosphere that would absorb either incoming light (thereby cooling the surface) or outgoing heat (thereby warming the surface). In practice, in the rarefied and windswept upper atmosphere, the material would disperse rather quickly, so that military use of such a technique would probably rely upon global rather than local effects”
Why this matters.
Anyone who had their eyes open knew there was probably trouble ahead. By the late 70s, that trouble was unmistakable.
What happened next?
Ten years later Macdonald, with Rafe Pomerance, would get the wheels rolling for the Charney report (see Nathaniel Rich’s “Losing Earth”).
By then MacDonald was also appearing on the Macneil Lehrer hour (1978) and so on. There’s a nice oral history interview here–
Basically, Macdonald is one of the (forgotten) good guys.
On this day, July 21, 1991, a three-day international conference “Greenhouse Action for the Nineties”, co-hosted by UNEP, The Climate Institute (the US version) and the short-livedNGO “Greenhouse Action Australia” began in Melbourne. At the end of it, a declaration. It gives you a sense of the earnestness and the technological primitivism (by today’s standards) that this
“was approved at the final plenary… constructed by a consensus process, using computer projection of wordings drafted in workshops conducted throughout the conference.”
The declaration called on
Australian governments at all levels to accelerate the development of programmes to convert interim planning targets into action, with priority funding for implementation;
local government authorities to participate more actively in the global climate debate and develop sustainable cities and living areas;
industries to seize opportunities afforded in the development of new and environmentally sound technologies to meet the global climate challenge; and
individuals to take personal responsibility for life-style changes that would lead to climate stabilisation and ecological sustainability.
Specifically on energy, there was this –
The context is that, around the world – and especially in Australia (thanks to the ground-laying work of Barry Jones (Hawke’s Science Minister 1983-1990), the Commission for the Future and the CSIRO Atmospheric Research Division (Graeme Pearman, Barrie Pittock and others) – people were taking “the greenhouse effect” seriously. Greenhouse Action Australia was part of that –
People thought something could and would be done about the problem. They saw it was, unless dealt with, going to lead to horror. They started groups, they held conferences, they made declarations….
Looking back, it’s “obvious” that they underestimated
a) the difficulty of keeping an issue (and groups) “live” and vibrant.
b) the sheer ferocity and skill of the industry-led pushback and the way that it would lead to a “culture war.”
That wasn’t their fault, on the whole. The reason we are in this godawful mess is not the fault of the people who tried (though they could have tried harder, smarter – but you can always say that). The fault – and the indictments at the Hague – though we had best hurry on that score – lay elsewhere.
Why this matters.
We need to (try to) learn from past mistakes (but remember that Hegel jibe too).
What happened next
The “greenhouse effect” became old news (pushed out by the first Western military action against Iraq, and by the sense that an international treaty, signed in Rio in 1992, had ‘solved’ the problem.
But the industry figures knew it would come back, as an issue, and they made sure they were ready. By then, most of the groups that had sprung up – like Greenhouse Action Australia – had died, so the industry figures had a much easier time spreading their lies. And with the 1996 arrival of the Howard government, it got easier still. The rest is “history”…
A friend and supporter of this project has asked me to write about “carbon credits,” which are right now a ‘hot topic’ (sorry) in Australian climate politics.
What follows is not a comprehensive history, and only partly references posts that have already gone up (more are lurking in the near future). The second half is given over more to – well, why the big focus on ‘carbon credits’ – what is allowed and disallowed by that focus?
Comments very welcome, but not about the existence or severity of climate change – the time between now and the Actual Fricking Apocalypse (AFA) is short, and I don’t intend to waste even a minute of it on trolls, bots and poster-children for the Dunning-Kruger effect.
Australia and economic instruments around climate change.
In 1973 (not 1971 as the Tweet says!) Treasury, responding to concerns about the “diseconomies” of economic growth, released a report.
On this day 8 June, 1971, the Australian Treasury released a report "Economic Growth: Is it Worth Having?" On page 11 and 12, it considers… “the greenhouse effect” and the build-up of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.https://t.co/8SiRbmAEVa 🧵 1/6 pic.twitter.com/8Q3Rbt3Doi
— All Our Yesterdays (@our_yesterdays) June 7, 2022
It basically wasn’t that bothered. And with hyper-inflation and all sorts of other economic mayhem, the Whitlam Government seems not to have paid attention.
So, let’s skip forward to the coming of the “Greenhouse Effect” in the late 80s – and we should always remember that thanks in part to Barry Jones (Hawke’s Science Minister) Australians were well-informed (Commission for the Future, Phillip Adams, The Greenhouse Project, Greenhouse 87, Greenhouse 88, Stephen Schneider, Barrie Pittock, Graeme Pearman etc).
In 1988, Barry Jones pointed out that a price on carbon dioxide was a reasonable economic measure. Other people were saying the same – this is uncontroversial – Pigou etc etc – you want to discourage something, you make it more expensive. “The market” then finds a way. So the story goes.
But in Australia, on climate, until 1995, the major focus was on a carbon tax rather than emissions trading. And it had advocates, beyond the Australian Conservation Foundation. And they pushed it within the “Environmentally Sustainable Development” process of 1990-91. And they lost. Or rather, the determined efforts of a growing “greenhouse mafia” (to shoot Guy Pearse’s useful formulation back before the existence of the AIGN) were successful in defeating a carbon tax. Ros Kelly, Hawke and then Keating’s Environment Minister, explicitly ruled out any price on carbon, both before and AT the Rio Earth Summit-
And was defeated, by an even more determined and sophisticated resistance.
And after this, for various reasons (mostly to do with what the Americans wanted/were willing to countenance) taxes fell away (Clinton, don’t forget, had been defeated on his BTU tax in 1994) and “emissions trading became the flavour of the month. You can see it in various Australian Treasury documents, in conferences, speeches etc.
The basic idea is you create a “market” and so its magic then… reduces emissions. Meanwhile, certifiers, bankers, lawyers all get rich.
There were two big efforts under Howard to get a national Emissions Trading Scheme going. Both were defeated – the 2000 one by Nick Minchin, the 2003 one by Howard himself. Check out Guy Pearse’s High and Dry for gory details, and also Marian Wilkinson’s The Carbon Club. And there is the work of Clive Hamilton too (esp Scorcher).
Advocates of emissions trading soldiered on. One key entrepreneur was Bob Carr (there are blog posts on this site about him coming up). At a time when all states had Labor governments, they were co-ordinating on a bottom-up emissions trading scheme. Howard was not happy.
Then, when climate change “took off” in the second half of 2006 in Australia, Kevin “I’m from Queensland, I’m here to help” Rudd latched onto climate as a wedge issue.
BUT he had to go carefully, not to scare Queensland voters.
some sort of carbon trading (he put Ross Garnaut in charge of that, while in opposition).
Howard tried to come back against this, saying he WOULD now introduce a carbon trading scheme if re-elected. But too little too late etc etc
What do we learn here? That carbon trading, carbon credits etc, are regarded as “common sense” (read Tony Gramsci on this!) as normal, reasonable and the best respectable position. Despite zero evidence that they would actually “work” at reducing emissions.
I don’t intend to go through the insane gory details of the period 2007 to 2012 (and onwards) – you have not bought me enough Cooper’s for that. But I will say this.
In early 2010, after Rudd’s “Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme” had failed twice, and while Rudd was being too spineless to call a double dissolution election on the “great moral challenge of our generation” the Greens proposed an interim solution, a … carbon tax. Labor ignored the proposal (hi Penny!).
So, let’s skip over the last 10 years of “carbon pricing.” Except this, from the Turnbull-Frydenberg era, may amuse…
By getting into carbon credits, you can give the appearance of wanting to do something/doing something, and getting everyone focussed on a very small/technical issue which few understand. Perfect! It makes it virtually impossible for civil society actors, with their pesky legitimacy and demands for morality and far-sightedness and courageous decisions, to be involved.
It means you don’t have to piss off those very rich people who are funding you.
That’s the political purpose/attractiveness of carbon credits, over and above any actual “efficiency”.
Two final things. What I am saying is not new, or profound. Check out
Compare it with a so-called “inefficient” tax. Which is easier to collect, offers far fewer opportunities for evasion, gaming, arbitrage, get-rich-quick-scamming. Funny how the complex stuff always wins out, eh?
What is to be done?
Oh, god, I have written about that so much. Try this.
